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Abstract
Using Taiwan’s quarterly time series data from 1973 to 2004, this paper investigates the
e#ect of minimum wage on youth employment and unemployment. The e#ect of minimum
wage is examined under data from 30 industries and after controlling for demand-side and
supply-side factors in the analysis, the estimation results show that a 10% jump in the
minimum wage would increase the youth employment rate and the youth labor participation
rate by 0.47 %, although no signiﬁcant e#ect was found for the youth unemployment rate. Our
results are consistent with (though the magnitude is small) the ﬁndings of the New Economics
of the Minimum Wage. However, we ﬁnd that the positive employment e#ect of minimum
wage is not driven by the decrease in youth unemployment, but rather mainly from the
increase in the participation rate by youths. Therefore, the policy implication derived from
Taiwan’s empirical study suggests that in the short run the minimum wage has no adverse
e#ect on youth employment, however, the long-run e#ect of the minimum wage on youths may
be large and harmful as the increasing early dropout of them from school into the labor market
interrupts the accumulation of human capital and thus deters the long-run economic growth
of the economy.
Keywords: Minimum wage, Employment rate, Labor participation rate, Unemployment rate
JEL classiﬁcation: J31, J38
I. Introduction
The impact of minimum wage legislation has been widely discussed and is a major
concern among labor economists, especially the e#ect of minimum wage on the employment of
youths —am ajor group that is inﬂuenced by such legislation. The conventional neoclassical
model predicts that the implementation of a minimum wage induces unemployment as long as
the demand curve for labor is downward slopping. Until recently, most time series studies in
U.S. are consistent with neoclassical predictions and ﬁnd that a 10% increase in the minimum
 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and Hui-chu Chiang and Wei-wen Lai for
excellence research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 47 (2006), pp.155-167.  Hitotsubashi Universitywage would lower teenager employment by between 1% to 3% (Brown, Gilory, and Kohen
(1982) and Brown (1988)).
1
Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994) and Card and Krueger (1995), however, challenge the
neoclassical predictions and demonstrate the sensitivity of past estimation results on model
speciﬁcation. With a sample extended into the 1980s, they ﬁnd that the impact of minimum
wage on teenager employment becomes less signiﬁcant. Their recent case studies suggest that
the latest increases in the minimum wage have had no signiﬁcant adverse e#ect on employment
(Katz and Krueger 1992, Card and Krueger 1994). This new line of research has been
rendered as the New Economics of Minimum Wage revolution. Burkhauser, Couch, and
Wittenburg (2000) do point out that as minimum wage changes occur in discrete steps through
time, the inclusion of variables in the estimations that have the e#ect of controlling for any
discrete change over time (e.g. a year dummy) is likely to substantially reduce the chance of
obtaining a precise estimate for the policy impact. Using alternative controls for mac-
roeconomic conditions, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant but modest negative relationship between
minimum wage increases and teenage employment.
2
Taiwan’s Labor Standard Law was implemented in 1984, when minimum wage legislation
was enacted. Ever since then, the minimum wage has had over seven adjustment stages, from
the beginning with a 62.19% coverage rate to 100% full coverage in 1999. According to the
survey of Wang, Ma, and Wu (1999), the compliance rate with the Minimum Wage Law is
90% in Taiwan. Moreover, the percentage of workers with a monthly wage below NT$15,000
(a wage slightly lower than the currently minimum wage of NT$15,840) is largest among
young workers between 15-24 years old, followed by the age group of 45-64 years old, and then
that of 25-44 years old. The corresponding ﬁgures are 7.56%, 4.12%, and 2.28%, respec-
tively.
3 Therefore, Taiwan deserves a careful study on the impact of minimum wage on
teenager employment. Taiwan’s labor market experience can provide an additional piece of
evidence and also shed light over our understanding on the impact of minimum wage on youth
employment.
This paper uses Taiwan’s cross-industry quarterly data from 1973:1 to 2004:4 to examine
the e#ect of minimum wage on youth employment and unemployment. Our ﬁndings are in
accordance with the line of the New Economics of Minimum Wage. However, the small but
positive e#ect of minimum wage on youth employment is mainly derived from the increase in
the youth labor participation rate induced by the growth in the minimum wage. Therefore,
from a long-run perspective, the impact of minimum wage slows down the accumulation of
human capital and thus hinders the long-run growth of an economy. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical model for the estimation. Section 3
contains data analysis and the description of the estimation method. Section 4 lays out the
estimation results. Concluding remarks are followed up in Section 5.
1 See also Meyer and Wise (1983), Linneman (1982), Wellington (1991), and Welch and Cunningham (1978),
among others.
2 See also Kennan (1995) for criticisms on the New Economics of Minimum Wage.
3 The corresponding ﬁgures for the monthly wage between NT$15,000-19,999 are 27.01%, 11.46%, and 8.44%,
respectively.
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As in the literature, the test for the e#ect of minimum wage on youth employment is
speciﬁed as:
Yf(MW, D, S, X)e,( 1 )
where Y is the youth employment variable, MW is the minimum wage variable, D and S stand
respectively for the demand-side and supply-side factors that a#ect youth employment, and X
represents other control variables such as time and regional dummies. In the literature the
dependent variable includes the employment-population ratio,
4 the labor participation rate,
5
and the unemployment rate.
6 In early studies, the e#ect of minimum wage focuses on the
unemployment rate of youths.
Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982) point out that one may encounter several caveats: (i)
If the increases of minimum wage cause teenagers to retreat from the labor market, then they
are classiﬁed as being not in the labor force and do not count as being unemployed.
Furthermore, if some of the teenagers enter the labor market and cannot ﬁnd jobs, then they
are counted as being unemployed, but this has nothing to do with the increase in the
unemployment rate due to an increase of the minimum wage. (ii) The deﬁnition of unemploy-
ment or an exit from the labor market is vague, as it is only conﬁned by the attitude of the
worker on whether he or she is aggressively searching for a job. However, the deﬁnition of
employment is very clear. (iii) According to the research purpose, the employment status can
be further classiﬁed as part-time or full-time employment. As the three variables (employment
rate, labor force participation rate, and unemployment rate) for youth labor activity are
closely related, in this study we separately test the e#ect of minimum wage on the youth
employment ratio, the labor participation rate, and the unemployment rate.










where i is an index for industry, MW is the minimum wage confronted by the industry, AW
is the average wage of the industry, Ei s the employment level of the industry, TE is the total
number of employed in the economy, and C stands for the coverage rate of the minimum wage
in the industry. Therefore, the Kaitz index is a weighted average of the minimum wage with
respect to the industry’s average wage, using the employment structure multiplied by the
coverage rate as the weight. The advantage of the Kaitz index is that it contains information
on the relative wage between the minimum wage and the average wage, the coverage rate of
the minimum wage, and the employment structure.
4 See, for example, Betsey and Dunson (1981), Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1983), Wellington (1991), Neu-
mark and Wascher (1992), Williams (1993), Card, Katz, and Krueger (1994), Card and Krueger (1995), and
Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg (2000).
5 See, for example, Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1983), Solon (1985), and Wellington (1991).
6 See, for example, Kaitz (1970), Moore (1971), and Adie (1973).
7 See, for example, Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1983), Solon (1985), Wellington (1991), Card and Krueger
(1995), and Park and Ratti (1998).
I=: :;;:8I D; B>C>BJB L6<: DC NDJI= :BEADNB:CI 6C9 JC:BEADNB:CI >C I6>L6C 2006] +/1As for the demand-side and supply-side factors, demand factors include the adult male
unemployment rate to capture the business cycle of the economy
8 and adult workers’ wage
(Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg (2000)) or average wage in the manufacturing industry
(Card and Krueger (1995)). Supply factors include the youth population as a share of the
population over 15 years old, teenagers in the armed force as a share of the teenager
population, teenagers’ school enrollment rate,
9 the share of 15-17 years old in the teenager
population (Card and Krueger (1995)), the share of teenagers in job training (Brown, Gilroy,
and Kohen (1983), and Park and Ratti (1998)), and the expenditure share of teenagers’ job
training (Wellington (1991)). However, Card and Krueger (1995) argue that teenagers’
employment level and their enrollment rate is negatively correlated, and therefore the inclusion
of the teenagers’ enrollment rate variable will cause an endogeneity problem in estimating the
e#ect of minimum wage.
Other control variables include a time trend, seasonal dummies, their interaction terms
(Wellington (1991), Card and Krueger (1995), Park and Ratti (1998)) and year, and
industry, region, and state dummies (Neumark and Wascher (1992), Williams (1993),
Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg (2000)) in the cross sectional or panel study.
This paper uses the widely-adopted Kaitz index as the measure for the minimum wage
variable. However, due to data limitation and availability in Taiwan’s labor market, the
independent variable includes the adult male unemployment rate, average wage in the
manufacturing industry, and teenagers’ population as a share in the total population above 15
years old, and a time trend and seasonal dummies.
Our empirical model is thus speciﬁed as:
ERta0ta1KIta2POPta3UMALEta4WAGEta5Tta6Qta7TtQtet,( 3 )
where index t denotes time, ER is the logarithmic form of the youth employment rate,KI is the
Kaitz index as the proxy for minimum wage, POP is the share of youth in the total population
above age 15, UMALE is the unemployment rate of adult males, WAGE is the average wage
of the manufacturing industry, Ti s the time trend, and Q is the seasonal dummy. However, in
order to closely examine the underlying reason for the change in the employment rate, we also
run the regressions as in equation (3) for the unemployment rate (UR) and the labor force
participation rate (LPR) as the dependent variable, separately.
10 For robustness of the
estimation, we also include the quadratic and cubic time trend, as well as an interaction term
of a time trend with di#erent combinations of seasonal dummies.
As for the signs of the explanatory variables, under perfect competition the imposition of
a minimum wage will theoretically reduce the employment level of youths and increase the
unemployment rate and labor participation rate of them. However, in a labor market with
8 See, for example, Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1983), Solon (1985), Wellington (1991), Neumark and
Wascher (1992), Card and Krueger (1995), Park and Ratti (1998), Williams and Mills (1998), and Burkhauser,
Couch, and Wittenburg (2000).
9 See, for example, Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1983), Solon (1985), Wellington (1991), Neumark and
Wascher (1992), Williams (1993), Card and Krueger (1995), Park and Ratti (1998), and Burkhauser, Couch, and
Wittenburg (2000).
10 As by deﬁnition, the employment rate is equal to one minus the unemployment rate multiplied by the labor
participation rate. Therefore, any changes in the employment rate may likely form changes in either the unemploy-
ment rate or the labor participation rate.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [December +/2monosony if the minimum wage is higher than the monosony wage, then the imposition of a
minimum wage increases the employment rate and reduces the unemployment rate; see, e.g.
Stigler (1946) and Maurice (1974).
Welch (1974) constructs a two-sector model, a covered sector, and an uncovered sector
to analyze the e#ect of minimum wage legislation. There are three choices for a typical worker
who is subject to minimum wage legislation and is forced to leave the current job. First, the
worker stays in the covered sector in order to keep looking for a job, the employment rate
decreases, the unemployment rate increases, and the labor participation rate remains un-
changed. Alternatively, the worker may shift and ﬁnd a job in the uncovered sector, which
decreases the wage and increases the employment of the uncovered sector. However, the total
e#ect on the employment rate and the unemployment rate is uncertain depending on the
underlying structure of the labor market. The worker may alternatively choose to exit the
labor market, which decreases the employment rate, the unemployment rate, and the labor
participation rate. As the three labor ﬂows happen at the same time, the e#ects of minimum
wage on the employment rate, the labor participation rate, and the unemployment rate are
hence undetermined.
III. The Data and Estimation Method
In the early years, Taiwan’s minimum wage was relatively stable, changing every 8 to 10
years, until December 1978 when the minimum monthly wage was increased from NT$600 to
NT$2400. The frequency of minimum wage adjustments then became shorter and regular at
a one or two-year intervals. This paper adopts quarterly data from 1973:1 to 2004:4, for a total
of 128 observations. Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1983) point out that quarterly data are more
suitable for an analysis of the minimum wage e#ect as quarterly data can reﬂect short-term
demand-side ﬂuctuations which annual data cannot and can prevent the noisy e#ect of any
incidental changes that may arise in the monthly data.
Constructing the Kaitz index requires an appropriate classiﬁcation of industry. As
manufacturing consists of a large employment proportion (about 30%) in Taiwan’s economy
and the production properties of manufacturing industries may be quite di#erent and diver-
gent, we use 22 two-digit industry
11 classiﬁcations for the manufacturing industry together
with other 8 industries
12 to form a complete set of 30 industries.
13 Data are from the Labor
Monthly Report, R.O.C., Monthly Report on Manpower Survey Statistics, Taiwan Area, R.O.
C., Monthly Bulletin of Earnings and Productivity Statistics, Taiwan Area, R.O.C., Quarterly
Report of Economic Trends, Taiwan Area, R.O.C., Labor Standard Law, and Report on
11 The 22 two-digit industries are food and beverage; tobacco; textiles; wearing apparel; leather and fur prod-
ucts; wood and bamboo products; furniture and ﬁxture; pulp, paper and paper products; printing pressing; chemi-
cal matter; chemical products; petroleum and coal products; rubber products; plastic products; non-metallic min-
eral products; basic metal; fabricated metal products; machinery and equipment; electric and electronics machin-
ery; transportation equipment; precision instrument; and miscellaneous industrial products.
12 The other eight industries are mining and quarrying; electricity, gas, and water; construction; commerce;
transport, storage, and communication; ﬁnancing, insurance, and real estate; business services; social, personal, and
related community services.
13 Most Taiwan studies on minimum wage use only a one-digit industry with manufacturing as a single indus-
try; see, e.g. Jiang and Sen (1987) and Huang (1995).
I=: :;;:8I D; B>C>BJB L6<: DC NDJI= :BEADNB:CI 6C9 JC:BEADNB:CI >C I6>L6C 2006] +/3Industry Survey. Table 1 presents the deﬁnition of variables and a summary of the basic
statistics. Figure 1 depicts the time trend for the Kaitz index, the employment rate, the labor
participation rate, and the unemployment rate of youths.
During the sample period, the population share of youths demonstrated a waning
propensity from 21.2% to 8.8%, which is reﬂection of a declining fertility rate over time. The
labor participation rate of youths shows a noticeable declining trend from 50% to 11% and the
employment rate also shares a similar pattern. The drop in the labor participation rate of
youths is mainly generated by the increase of youths’ school enrollment. However, the
unemployment rate of youths experienced an increasing trend from 2.4% to 12%. The rise in
the youth unemployment rate is a response to the rapid industrial structure change towards
more capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries which generate demand for more
skilled workers. Therefore, the drop in youth labor participation rate together with the
T67A: 1. D:;>C>I>DCH 6C9 SJBB6GN SI6I>HI>8H D; I=: V6G>67A:H




ages 1519 as a share of
the population of ages
15-19 in logarithmic form
0.278 (0.126) Monthly Bulletin of Labor





Labor force of ages 15-19
as a share of the
population of ages 15-19
in logarithmic form




ages 15-19 as a share of
the labor force of ages
15-19 in logarithmic form
0.065 (0.035) Same as above
POP Population share of
youths
Population of ages 15-19
as a share of total
population over age 15




workers of ages 25-44 as
a share of the male labor
force of ages 25-44
0.019 (0.014) Same as above
KI Kaitz index Weighted average of
minimum wage relative to
average wage in the
industry, as the weight is
the employment share of
workers of ages 15-19 in
the industry multiplied by
the coverage rate of the
industry
0.293 (0.095) Same as above;
Labor Earnings and Productivity
Statistics, Taiwan Area, R.O.C.;
Labor Standard Law;
Report on Industrial Survey,
Taiwan, R.O.C.
WAGE Average wage of the
manufacturing industry
Average wage of the
manufacturing industry
divided by the consumer
price index in
logarithmic form
9.637 (0.875) Labor Earnings and Productivity
Statistics, Taiwan Area, R.O.C.;
Report on Price Statistics, Taiwan
Area, R.O.C.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [December +0*increase in youth unemployment rate has governed the declining trend of youth employment
rate.
As the current shock to youth employment may a#ect the future minimum wage level, the
OLS estimates of equation (3) in this case are inconsistent. Thus, the OLS regression with the
Newey-West correction standard error is used in the estimation of equation (3).
14 Another
possible criticism of the OLS estimation of equation (3) is that variables are not cointegrated
and that the results are spurious. We also perform test for the unit root and cointegration and
ﬁnd that all the models presented in Table 2 do pass the cointegration test.
15 Burkhauser,
Couch, and Wittenburg (2000) point out that the minimum wage policy used to change over
time, and hence empirically the minimum wage variable is likely to be correlated and the
inclusion of a time dummy will essentially absorb and cover the e#ect of the minimum wage.
They claim that it is this time dummy e#ect that renders the e#ect of minimum wage
insigniﬁcant as in most time-series studies. Thus, we perform both estimations with and
without a time dummy as well.
IV. Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results. Without time trend and seasonal dummies, from
model (1) the e#ect of the minimum wage on the employment rate is positive but insigniﬁcant.
However, including time trend and seasonal dummies, from model (2) the e#ect of minimum
14 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this issue.
15 The estimation results for the cointegration test are available from the author upon request.
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I=: :;;:8I D; B>C>BJB L6<: DC NDJI= :BEADNB:CI 6C9 JC:BEADNB:CI >C I6>L6C 2006] +0+wage on the employment rate turns positive and signiﬁcant. The estimation result suggests that
a 10% increase in the minimum wage will increase the youth employment rate by 0.47%.
As for the e#ect of the adult male unemployment rate, which is a proxy for the business
cycle on the demand side, when the economy is in a downturn the demand for labor will
theoretically contract, while when the economy is in an upturn the demand for labor will
expand. Thus, we expect a negative sign for the business cycle variable. From models (1) and
(2) the coe$cient of adult male unemployment is negative and signiﬁcant which is consistent
with the expected sign. The average wage of the manufacturing industry, a proxy for the wage
of an adult worker, is also negative and signiﬁcant for both models. Theoretically, if adult
workers and young workers are substitutes, then the coe$cient should be positive. On the
contrary, if adult workers and young workers are complements, then the coe$cient should be
negative. Our estimation results imply a complementary relationship between adult and young
workers.
For the supply-side variable, under both models the share of teenagers in the population
T67A: 2. T=: E;;:8I D; M>C>BJB W6<: DC YDJI= EBEADNB:CI,
UC:BEADNB:CI, 6C9 L67DG P6GI>8>E6I>DC R6I:
ER LPR UR
(1) (2)# (3) (4)# (5) (6)#
KI 0.022 0.046 0.030 0.047 0.017 0.00003
(0.050) (0.018)** (0.057) (0.018)*** (0.019) (0.010)
POP 1.727 1.828 1.691 1.798 0.680 0.618
(0.543)*** (0.190)*** (0.402)*** (0.186)*** (0.198)*** (0.150)***
UMALE 1.13 0.421 0.907 0.156 2.052 2.180
(0.229) (0.147)*** (0.244)*** (0.130) (0.147)*** (0.134)***
WAGE 0.064*** 0.068 0.070 0.068 0.025 0.013
(0.011) (0.019)*** (0.012)*** (0.018)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)
T 0.005 0.005 0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
T
2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)**
T
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)
Q2 0.031 0.032 0.0001
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)
Q3 0.032 0.042 0.012***
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)
Q4 0.025 0.028 0.002
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)
Constant 0.665 0.604 0.742 0.625 0.358 0.051
(0.164)*** (0.006)*** (0.182) (0.125)*** (0.092)*** (0.077)
Observation 128 128 128 128 128 128
F-statistics 764.9 2836.62 611.79 2940.6 123.86 220.54
Notes: KI stands for the Kaitz index; ER is the youth employment rate; LPR is the youth labor participation
rate; UR is the youth unemployment rate; POP is the population share of youths; UMALE is the adult
male unemployment rate; WAGE is the average wage of the manufacturing industry in logarithmic
form. # Regression also includes interaction terms of a time trend and quarterly dummies. Figures in
the parenthesis are Newey-West correction standard error. *, **, and *** stand for a statistical
signiﬁcant level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [December +0,over 15 years old has a positive and signiﬁcant e#ect on the youth employment rate. An
increase in the population of youths provides itself with the function of being a reserve army
for potential employment and hence increases the employment rate of youths. The estimation
results suggest that a 1%i ncrease in the share of youth population will increase the youth
employment rate by 1.83%. These results imply that the e#ect of supply factors is relatively
more important than that of demand factors in the teenager labor market.
Models (3) and (4) show the estimation results for the labor participation rate of youths.
Without time trend and seasonal dummies, the e#ect of minimum wage on the youth labor
participation rate is positive but insigniﬁcant. However, with time trend and seasonal dummies
included, the e#ect of minimum wage turns positive and signiﬁcant. A 10% increase in
minimum wage will increase the youth labor participation rate by 0.47%. Thus, the increase
in minimum wage has a signiﬁcantly positive e#ect on both the employment rate and labor
participation rate of youths.
The coe$cient of adult male unemployment is also positive but insigniﬁcant after
including time trend and seasonal dummies. It seems to imply that, when the economy is in a
downturn the unemployment rate rises, the income of families drops, and the expenditure on
education shrinks, and hence youths drop out of school and enter the labor market early. In
contrast, when the economy is in an upturn the unemployment rate falls, the income of
families rises, and the expenditure in education increases, and hence youths attain more
education and delay their entry to the labor market. However, the coe$cient of the average
wage of the manufacturing industry, a proxy for the wage of adult workers, is also negative
and signiﬁcant as in the case of employment rate, implying that a general wage increase will
attract youths to participate in the labor market. The e#ect of the share of the youth
population has a positive and signiﬁcant e#ect on youths’ labor participation rate. A 1%
increase in the share of youth population will increase youths’ labor participation rate by
1.80%.
Models (5) and (6) show the estimation results of the e#ect of minimum wage on the
youth unemployment rate. With or without controlling for time trend and seasonal dummies,
the minimum wage e#ect on the youth unemployment rate is insigniﬁcant. This ﬁnding is in
accordance with that in the U.S. of the so-called New Economics of Minimum Wage. The
adult male unemployment rate itself has a positive and signiﬁcant e#ect, implying that when
the economy is in a downturn this macro shock will hurt the labor market across the working
groups. The e#ect of the average wage of the manufacturing industry is negative and
signiﬁcant, but it becomes positive and insigniﬁcant after controlling for time trend and
seasonal dummies. This may imply that the increase in the wage of adult workers has an
insigniﬁcant e#ect on the unemployment rate of young workers. As for the supply-side factor,
the e#ect of the share of the youth population is negative and signiﬁcant with or without
controlling for time trend and seasonal dummies. From models (2) and (4), an increase in the
youth population will increase the employment rate as well as the labor participation rate of
youths. Moreover, the magnitude on the employment rate is slightly larger than that on the
labor participation rate (1.83  1.80), hence rendering a net negative e#ect on the unemploy-
ment rate of youths.
In summary, without time trend and seasonal dummies, the minimum wage e#ect on
youth employment and unemployment in Taiwan is insigniﬁcant. However, because we adopt
quarterly time series data, a control for the time trend and seasonal adjustment is required.
I=: :;;:8I D; B>C>BJB L6<: DC NDJI= :BEADNB:CI 6C9 JC:BEADNB:CI >C I6>L6C 2006] +0-After controlling for the time trend and seasonal dummies, we ﬁnd that the minimum wage
e#ects on the youth employment rate and the labor participation rate are positive and
signiﬁcant. These results are robust as we also include the quadratic and cubic time trend, as
well as the interaction term of a time trend with di#erent combinations of seasonal dummies.
The ﬁndings are consistent with that in the recent literature under the nomenclature of New
Economics of Minimum Wage. Our estimation results show that a 10% increase in the
minimum wage will increase the youth employment rate and youth labor participation rate by
0.47%, which has an insigniﬁcant e#ect on the youth unemployment rate.
By deﬁnition, the employment rate  (1-unemployment rate)*labor participation rate.
Though an increase in minimum wage will increase the employment rate of youths, the main
source of the increase is through the growth in the labor participation rate of youths and not
through the decrease in the youth unemployment rate. Putting it another way, the increase in
Taiwan’s minimum wage has induced more young people to drop out of school and enter the
labor market which in turn has increased their employment rate.
16
Previous Taiwan studies, as in the early literature of Jiang and Sen (1987) and Wang, Ma,
and Wu (1999), ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative e#ects of minimum wage on the male youth
employment rate or participation rate. Hanug (1995) also shows a negative but small e#ect on
the youth employment rate, unemployment rate, and labor participation rate only for certain
youth groups. However, Haung and Jiang (1998) present that the minimum wage has a
positive e#ect on the youth employment rate only in northern and eastern regions of Taiwan.
Except for Jiang and Sen (1987), these previous Taiwan studies all use either monthly or
yearly data which are less suitable for an analysis of the e#ect of minimum wage; see, for
example, Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982). Moreover, they adopt either a real minimum
wage or the ratio of the minimum wage with respect to the average wage in the manufacturing
industry instead of calculating the Kaitz index (a widely-adopted proxy for the minimum wage
variable) as this paper does.
V. Concluding Remarks
The aim of minimum wage legislation is to protect marginal workers so that they may
receive a wage that guarantees a certain level of living standard is met. Ever since the
implementation of Taiwan’s Labor Standard Law in 1984, the minimum wage has received its
legitimate position. Until now, the minimum wage policy in Taiwan has gone through seven
adjustment periods and has covered all the business sectors since 1999 with a 90% high
compliance rate. Therefore, the study of Taiwan’s labor market should be able to shed light on
the e#ect of minimum wage on youth employment and unemployment.
Studies in the U.S. render mixed results, as recent studies there provide evidence that
challenges the conventional wisdom derived from the neoclassical model. Using quarterly
time-series data, the ﬁnding of this paper’s empirical study on Taiwan is in the spirit of recent
16 According to a survey on the youth population in 2000, the share of youths 15-24 years old who are either
not in school or not in the labor market was 12.3%, among which 33.5% were looking for a job and 19.3% were
preparing for a school entrance exam. Therefore, the actual share of youths remaining at home was relatively
small at around 6%. Thus, over 90% of youths not in the labor force were engaging in either school or preparing
for an entrance exam.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [December +0.studies whereby the e#ect of minimum wage is less signiﬁcant or even positive on the youth
employment rate. However, the magnitude is relatively small, about a quarter of that found in
the U.S. Furthermore, a close examination on the e#ect of minimum wage on the youth
employment rate, the labor participation rate, and the unemployment rate in Taiwan shows
that the positive e#ect of the minimum wage on youth employment is mainly from the increase
in youths’ labor participation rate induced by a higher expected wage, and not from the
decrease in the youth unemployment rate.
From policy viewpoints, in the short run the implementation of a minimum wage
increases the employment of youths and has no adverse e#ect on the youth unemployment rate.
However, in the long run the increase of the youth employment rate will mainly come from the
increase in the youth labor participation rate —i .e., from the trend of teenagers to drop out
early from school. This long-run e#ect can be huge and adverse to the economy as it will slow
down the accumulation of human capital and hence deter the long-run growth of the economy.
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